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Recent Developments:
The Uniform Arbitration Act*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is an overview of recent court decisions that interpret state versions
of the Uniform Arbitration Act ("U.A.A.").' Arbitration statutes patterned after the
U.A.A. have been adopted by thirty-four states and the District of Columbia.' The
goal of this project is to promote uniformity in the interpretation of the U.A.A. by
articulating the underlying policies and rationales of recent court decisions
interpreting the U.A.A.3
II. SECTION 1: VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Section 1 of the U.A.A. provides that:
[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or
a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy
thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable,
save upon grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. This act also applies to arbitration agreements between
employers and employees or between their respective representatives
[unless otherwise provided in the agreement] ."
When resolving a case concerning an arbitration clause, a court must first
determine if the parties have consummated a valid agreement. If the court finds that
the agreement is valid, it next must decide whether the parties' dispute falls within
the scope of the clause.
A. The Existence of an Agreement to Arbitrate
The U.A.A. does not require the use of particular terminology, such as
"arbitrators," in order to create a valid arbitration agreement.5 In Society of
* This project was written and prepared by Journal of Dispute Resolution candidates under the
direction of Associate Editor in Chief James Giacone and Comment Editor Matthew S. McBride.
1. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985).
2. Jurisdictions that have adopted arbitration statutes based on the U.A.A. include: Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming.
3. This Article surveys cases decided between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 1997.
4. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § I.
5. Society of Am. Foresters v. Renewable Natural Resources Found., 689 A.2d 662 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1997); see Northern Indiana Commuter Transp. Dist. v. Chicago Southshore & South Bend R.R.,
685 N.E.2d 680,695 (Ind. 1997) (agreements described in Section 1 are written agreements and control
1
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American Foresters v. Renewable Natural Resources Foundation, the owner of
development rights sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether a special
zoning exception for development had lapsed.6 In affirming the trial court's
dismissal of the SAF's complaint, the court held that the parties' settlement
agreement contained a valid arbitration clause and that the zoning dispute was
arbitrable.7
Formalized in their 'settlement agreement, the parties reached an
accommodation of their respective positions after experiencing disagreements that
led to litigation! Under the settlement agreement, SAF received fee title to a parcel
of the Center. However, SAF was prevented from selling any part of their parcel
unless RNRF failed to exercise due diligence or the Center was no longer a viableproject.9 The settlement agreement specified a three-member panel to determine
whether RNRF satisfied the due diligence and viability tests. 0 To ensure these and
other restrictions would not be eternal, the parties agreed to conduct a joint review
at ten-year intervals." RNRF and SAF each selected a panel member of their
choosing; however, the parties' designated panel members could not initially agree
as to the third member. 2 At the hearing on RNRF's motion to dismiss, SAF noted
the absence of the term "arbitration" or the implication of binding arbitration in the
settlement agreement and argued that the controversy surrounding the legitimacy of
RNRF's special exception should by resolved by a court. 3
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals stated that it must first determine
whether an agreement to arbitrate existed between the parties. 4 Although the
"panel" members were not referred to as arbitrators in the settlement agreement, the
court noted the settlement agreement stated that "disagreement" on the issues of due
diligence and viability ''will be settled by" the three person panel.'5 Moreover,
despite SAF's contentions to the contrary, the court also found that the language of
the agreement plainly provided that the panel's findings were binding. 6 In finding
a valid arbitration clause, the court articulated that no particular form of words is
indispensable to the making of a valid agreement to adjust and mediate a dispute
where the arbitration proceedings are to be conducted).
6. Society ofAm. Foresters, 689 A.2d at 663. Subsequent to this complaint filed by the Society ofAmerican Foresters (SAF), the Renewable Resources Foundation (RNRF) submitted a motion to dismiss.
Id.
7. Id. at 668. SAF was a non-profit corporation organized to advance science, technology, education,
and professional forestry while using the knowledge and skills of the profession to benefit society ingeneral. Id. at 663. Originally created by SAF, RNRF was a non-profit corporation established todevelop the Wild Acres property into the Renewable Natural Resources Center ("Center"). Id. The WildAcres site was zoned for residential use, hence a special exception to construct office buildings had to
be obtained before RNRF could develop the Center. Id.
8. Id. at 664. The Settlement Agreement was premised on the validity of the Special Exception
granted to RNRF. Id.
9. Id. at 665.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The third member was chosen while this was case pending. Id.
13. Id. at 667.
14. Id. at 666.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 667.
[Vol. 1998, No. 2
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without resort to litigation. 7 Indeed, the language need not include "arbitrate" nor
"arbitration"; only some reliable evidence from the language employed that the
parties intended the contested issue to be subject to arbitration."8
In Friday v. Trinity Universal of Kansas,'9 the Supreme Court of Kansas was
charged to assess whether an "appraisal clause" constitutes a valid and enforceable
arbitration clause.2" Friday's house was insured by Trinity Universal ("Trinity").2
Following fire damage to the house, the parties could not agree on the amount of
loss.22 Trinity offered payment to Friday and stated that if Friday did not accept, it
would invoke the appraisal provision of the insurance policy.23 However, Friday
rejected the offer and subsequently filed suit against Trinity.24 In so doing, Friday
argued that the appraisal provision constituted an arbitration agreement by another
name and thus violated Kansas' version of Section 1 of the U.A.A.25
Although the court determined that the Kansas statute at issue barred
enforcement of arbitration clauses in insurance contracts, the court failed to perceive
a meaningful distinction between appraisal and arbitration and ruled that appraisal
clauses were in fact agreements to arbitrate. 26 The court did observe that "arbitration
is a more adversarial proceeding than a normal appraisal."27 However, in the end,
the court noted "the ... result is the same [in that] a controversy is settled. '2 a
The decision in Scherer v. Scherer9 illustrates the principal that in order to
invoke the U.A.A. to suppress the opposing party's ability to appeal, the contract
17. Id.
18. Id.; see also, City of Denver v. District Court of Denver, 939 P.2d 1353 (Colo. 1997) (use of
official related to one of the parties as arbitrator does not render a dispute resolution clause invalid so
long as the clause provides for judicial review of the official's determination).
19. 939 P.2d 869 (Kan. 1997).





25. Id. The court decided that the McCarran-Ferguson Act controlled the issue. The McCarran-
Ferguson Act provides in part: "No act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating insurance." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994). The
court held that because the Kansas version of the U.A.A. regulated the business of insurance, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act precluded application of the F.A.A. and the arbitration clause was
unenforceable based on Section § 5-401(c)(1) of the Kansas U.A.A. which bars enforcement of
arbitration clauses in insurance contracts. Id. at 872; see also Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters
at Lloyd's of London, 119 F.3d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 1997) (Missouri's Uniform Arbitration Act provides
that written agreements to arbitrate disputes are valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except in contracts
of insurance and contracts of adhesion).
26. Friday, 939 P.2d at 871-72. The court stated that the determinative question was whether the
Kansas legislature intended to include appraisals as a form of arbitration when it precluded arbitration
clauses in insurance contracts or whether it intended for appraisals to be of separate nature and allowable
in insurance contracts. Id. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401(b) (1996) which provides that a written
contract may provide for arbitration of future controversies between the parties and that such a provision
is "valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon such grounds as exist at law or equity for the
revocation of any contract." The provision in question, 5-401 (c), states: "The provisions of subsection
(b) shall not apply to: (1) Contracts of insurance." Id.
27. Friday, 939 P.2d at 871.
28. Id.
29. 931 P.2d 251 (Wyo. 1997).
1998]
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language must legally define whether the issues involved are appealable.30 InScherer, Mrs. Scherer filed for divorce and requested primary care, custody and
control of the parties' two minor children, as well as distribution of the parties' assets
and liabilities.3 Subsequent to the initial complaint, the parties notified the court oftheir stipulation "to submit the case to the court pursuant to an informal hearing inlieu of a formal trial. '3 2 The trial court henceforth granted divorce, distributed
marital property, and ordered joint custody of the parties' two minor children, withprimary care and custody to Mrs. Scherer subject to liberal visitation by Mr.
Scherer.3
Following the trial court ruling, Mrs. Scherer appealed the property distribution
and custody arrangements. 4 In response, Mr. Scherer contended that the "informalproceeding was binding arbitration governed by the U.A.A." and therefore was not
subject to appeal. 5 The proceedings were described in the record as "hybrid,"
"binding mediation," "binding arbitration," "binding mediation arbitration. 3 6 The
record, however, further disclosed that the parties agreed and stipulated to aninformal hearing, not arbitration.37 The Supreme Court of Wyoming held that it
"must treat the informal proceeding as if it were a formal trial proceeding and
endorse the appeal based upon an abuse of discretion standard."" Also, becauseWyoming defines arbitration as a contractual right,39 the absence of an arbitration
agreement in the record further precludes the possibility of invoking binding
arbitration.4 °
B. The Scope of the Agreement to Arbitrate
If such an agreement exists, the court next must determine whether the subject
matter of the dispute is within the ambit of the arbitration clause.4' There must be
some reliable evidence from the language of the contract that the parties intended thedisputed issue to be subject to arbitration, the intent of the parties being the
controlling factor.4 2
In accordance with the strong public policy favoring arbitration of disputes,
courts usually interpret arbitration provisions as broadly "as the words and intentions




34. Id. at 252.




39. Id. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-36-103 (Michie 1977).40. Id. The court noted that the trial court acknowledged at an earlier hearing that the issues wereappealable when it stated: "Either party is welcome, of course, to subject my rulings, the record in thiscase, any of my decisions to any appellate scrutiny they wish, represented by whomever they wish, but
this portion of litigation, in my mind, is over." Id.
41. Society of Am. Foresters, 689 A.2d at 666.
42. Id.
[Vol. 1998, No. 2
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of the parties will warrant."4 3 Although the U.A.A. mandates that the agreement to
arbitrate must be valid, courts may enforce an arbitration provision following
termination of the parties' contract. In Samson, M.D. v. Hartsville Hospital, Inc.,
Samson agreed to a one-year Physician Agreement with Hartsville Hospital
("Hartsville") on October 8, 1993 whereby Samson would establish a practice in the
city of Hartsville." Upon the written consent of both parties, the contract could be
renewed for one additional year.45 To enable Samson to meet his operating expenses
and guarantee a floor under his income, the hospital provided assistance in the form
of advancements.4 Pursuant to a provision within the agreement, repayment of the
advancements was to be completed following termination of the contract.
4 7
Termination was provided for as follows: "In the event that either party notifies the
other of intent to terminate the agreement, either party to this agreement may request
binding arbitration to resolve any disagreements, with the cost of such arbitration
being equally shared.
41
Despite neither party notifying the other of any intent to renew, the parties
maintained performance after October 8, 1994 .49 Following an August 14, 1995 sale
of the hospital, the new owners sent Samson a notice of their intent to terminate the
agreement while also requesting reimbursement of the advancements.50 Samson
denied the request and argued that the termination was without cause, thus
"extinguishing his obligation to repay the advancements."'" Due to the parties'
inability to resolve their differences, "the hospital invoked the arbitration provisions
of the contract." 2
After the trial court enjoined the hospital from pursuing arbitration, Samson
argued on appeal that the "parties' failure to renew the contract eliminated all his
obligations under that contract, including the obligation to submit disputes to
arbitration."53 Additionally, he asserted that his duties under the contract expired the
date the hospital was sold "because the sale rendered the signatories unable to
perform in accordance with its provisions."' Hartsville responded that the contract
43. Samson, M.D. v. Hartsville Hosp., Inc., No. 01-A-01-9609-CH-00430, 1997 WL 107167 at *4
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1997) (citing DeWitt v. AI-Haddad, Appeal No. 89-394-11 (filed Apr. 25,
1990)).
44. Id. at * 1.
45. Id.
46. Id. A provision within the agreement required repayment of the advancements after the contract
came to an end, and also for forgiveness of that obligation on a prorated basis if Samson continued to
maintain a practice in Hartsville. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. The termination section also allowed the parties to terminate the contract without cause upon
sixty days notice, or to terminate it for cause without notice, upon certain specified happenings or upon
the "failure of either party to faithfully and diligently carry out the provisions of this agreement.
Termination of the agreement by Samson without cause, or termination by the hospital with cause would
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remained in effect after October 8, 1994, because both parties continued to perform
under it."
In reversing the trial court's finding that the arbitration clause no longer applied
to Samson, the Tennessee Court of Appeals stated that the refund Hartsville
demanded was based upon advancements that arose under the contract, and that the
arbitration clause, which provides for binding arbitration to resolve "any
disagreement," must of necessity include disagreements about those advancements. -
The court further noted that the contract "apparently anticipated that such arbitration
may occur" after the expiration of its initial one-year term in light of the clause "that
compels the hospital to reduce the doctor's obligation of repayment ... for every
year that the physician remains in active practice in the service area following the
expiration of the term of this agreement. 5 7 As a result of the clear evidence that the
parties intended for disagreements involving the remuneration of advancements be
resolved by arbitration and the "uncertainties surrounding the legal effects of the
hospital's purported termination of the contract, the court held that the dispute
should be resolved using arbitration. 8 The court expressed that its decision was
reinforced by the policy that courts generally construe arbitration clauses liberally
and resolve any doubts in favor of arbitration.59
In Metro Construction Co. v. Cogun Industries, the parties entered into an
agreement in which Cogun Industries ("Cogun") subcontracted a portion of a church
construction contract to Metro Construction ("Metro"). 60 As part of this
construction, Metro "installed plywood onto the exterior of the church building.",61
Metro maintained that Cogun inspected and approved the plywood prior to
installment, which Cogun summarily denied. 62 Following the owner's contention
that the materials employed by Metro failed to comply with the contract, the owner
withheld payment to Cogun, who in turn refused to compensate Metro.63 In
response, Metro then filed suit seeking payment due under the contract. 64
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that because the contract contained a
written agreement to "settle all controversies and claims arising out of or related to
the contract by arbitration," the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for
plaintiff.65 The court indicated that the "plain language" of the contract made it
explicit that the parties had intended that any controversy regarding the contract was
to be resolved by arbitration.6 The court stated that "where the contract between the
parties contains an arbitration clause, the court should apply a presumption of
55. Id. Further, Hartsville contended that Samson's complaint contained a binding judicial admission
and that arbitration was appropriate due to the clear legislative and public policy favoring that mode of
dispute resolution. Id. at *3.
56. Id. at *3.
57. Id.
58. Id. at *4.
59. Id.
60. No. 02A01-9608-CH-00207, 1997 WL 538914, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 1997),
61. Id.
62. Id. at * 1-2.
63. Id. at *2.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *3.
66. Id.
[Vol. 1998, No. 2
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arbitrability, resolve any doubts in favor of arbitration, and should not deny an order
to arbitrate unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause
is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. 67
In B.L. Hodge Company v. Roxco, Ltd., the Tennessee Court of Appeals was
asked to decide whether a claim for rescission was to be resolved through arbitration
pursuant to the parties' contract or adjudicated in court.6' The initial dispute arose
regarding the provisions of a construction subcontract.69 Under the subcontract, B.L.
Hodge ("Hodge") was to complete, among other duties, handrail work. 7' A
disagreement ensued regarding the amount of handrail that was to be assembled,
however, which ultimately led Hodge to seek rescission of the contract.7' Roxco
urged that Hodge should be bound by the arbitration provision in the contract that
Hodge had signed.72
At trial, Hodge maintained that the contract should be rescinded due to
fraudulent inducement on the part of Roxco.73 However, the trial court ruled that the
parties had not agreed on the amount of the handrail, and that the contract was
subject to rescission.74 The implicit result of this finding was that the contract,
including the arbitration clause, was declared invalid.75
The Tennessee Court of Appeals noted that rescission is available only under
the most demanding circumstances and is appropriate when a party has been induced
to enter into a contract by fraud, duress, or undue influence.76 The court further
noted that claims for rescission of the whole contract are exempted from arbitration
proceedings.77 Notwithstanding this declaration, the court did not find that Roxco
was guilty of fraudulent inducement, nor did they locate evidence in the record or
other circumstances to support such a claim.7' The court held that the parties signed
a contract with an arbitration clause and that the arbitrator must decide the legal
obligations of the parties.79 The court noted its obligation "to resolve any doubts in
favor of arbitration."80
III. SECTION 2: PROCEEDINGS TO COMPEL OR STAY ARBITRATION
Section 2 of the U.A.A. governs proceedings to compel or stay arbitration.8'
In such a proceeding, the party seeking to compel or stay arbitration must show that
67. Id. (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Mead Corp., 21 F.3d 128, 131 (6th Cir. 1994)).
68. No. 03A01-9704-CH-00144, 1997 WL 64490, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1997).
69. Id. at *1.
70. Id.





76. Id. at *3.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at *4.
80. Id.
81. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 2.
1998]
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an agreement to arbitrate exists and that the other party refuses to participate in the
arbitration process.82 Upon a party's motion to compel or stay arbitration, a court
must determine two things: (1) whether there is a valid, written agreement to
arbitrate and (2) whether the agreement covers the disputed issue.83 The courts have
also been called upon to decide other issues, such as whether the parties can proceed
to discovery pending a motion to compel arbitration.
A. The Existence of an Agreement to Arbitrate Between the Parties
A court may ascertain that a valid arbitration agreement exists between parties
not privy to the original agreement.14 In Smith v. Cumberland Group, Ltd., an
arbitration clause incorporated within a contract between an owner and general
contractor was assigned to another contractor.8 5 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania
resolved the question of whether the arbitration clause remained effective when a
dispute arose between the owner and assignee-contractor. 86
In Smith, Cumberland, as the original general contractor, and Smith, the owner,
formulated a contract for renovations and improvements to a restaurant.8 7 The
parties' contract contained an arbitration clause wherein the parties agreed to
arbitrate any disputes arising out of or relating to the contract documents.88
Cumberland assigned the contract to Mass Construction Group ("Mass") as part of
the sale of Cumberland's assets to Mass. 9 Following the sale and during
construction, Mass conducted weekly job conferences at the job site which were
attended by Smith representatives.9" Notes from these conferences on Mass
letterhead were sent to Smith. 9' In turn, Smith corresponded directly to Mass
concerning construction progress, and Smith signed five progress payment checks
made payable to Mass.92 When a dispute ensued over the substantial completion
date for the venture, Smith withheld payment of the balance from Mass. 93 Shortly
thereafter, Mass filed a demand for arbitration against Smith pursuant to the assigned
contract.94 In addition to instigating a civil complaint against Cumberland, Smith
filed an application to stay arbitration under Pennsylvania's version of Section 2
82. Id. § 2(a).
83. Smith v. Cumberland Group, Ltd., 687 A.2d 1167, 1171 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
84. Id. at 1172.
85. Id. at 1169.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Article 15.8 of the contract provided: "All claims or disputes between the Contractor and the
Owner arising out of or relating to the Contract documents, or the breach thereof, shall be decided by
arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association currently in effect unless the parties mutually agree otherwise and subject to an initial
presentation of the claim or dispute to the Architect as required under Paragraph 15.5." Id. at 1169 n.2.
89. Id. at 1169-70. The assignment agreement furnished in pertinent part as follows: "This shall be
a binding Agreement between all assigns and nominees of the parties and is confirmed by execution
below by their duly authorized representatives." Id. at 1170 n.3.
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claiming that Mass was not a party to the contract and that Smith never agreed to
arbitrate any claim or dispute with Mass. 95 Cumberland and Mass appealed
following the trial court's decision to stay arbitration pending resolution of Smith's
civil claim.
96
Smith's sole assertion on appeal was that the agreement to arbitrate was not
assignable without his consent.97 Specifically, Smith stated that he would have
withheld consent considering that performance under the contract was already in
default when the contract was assigned.9" Smith's theory was that an arbitration
clause is personal and that the non-consenting party relinquishes constitutional and
procedural rights by waiving a jury trial and agreeing to arbitrate.99 Cumberland and
Mass countered by arguing that the contract as a whole, including the arbitration
provision, was assignable without Smith's consent and that Smith's subsequent
actions ratified the assignment.'00
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania began its analysis by noting that when one
party to an agreement seeks to prevent another from proceeding to arbitration,
judicial inquiry is limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate
exists between the parties and, if so, (2) whether the dispute involved is within the
scope of the arbitration provision.'0 ' The court further noted that absent an express
provision against assignment, the rights and duties under an executory bilateral
contract which does not involve personal skill, trust, or confidence may be assigned
without the consent of the other party.'0 2 The court explained that such an
assignment is valid so long as it does not materially alter the other party's duties and
responsibilities.'0 3 The obligor may also adopt an otherwise invalid or ineffective
assignment by his conduct. °' In light of the foregoing, the court held that
Cumberland's assignment to Mass was effective, and that Mass could enforce the
arbitration provision against Smith to settle any controversies within the scope of the
arbitration provision. 'O Any question as to the assignment's validity were moot in
light of Smith's subsequent conduct toward Mass. 1
06
In support of its decision, the court noted that an obligation to arbitrate is not
necessarily limited only to those who personally signed the agreement, as ordinary
contract principles determine who is bound.'0 7 The court declared that when parties
of equal bargaining power design a contract without restrictions on assignability and
mutually agree that the resolution of any future disputes should be determined by
arbitration, they must be bound by that provision instead of being allowed to avoid
95. Id.; see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7304(b) (West 1998).
96. Smith, 687 A.2d. at 1170.
97. Id. at 1171-72.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1173.
100. Id. at 1172.
101. Id. at 1171.
102. Id. at 1172.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1173.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1173-74.
1998]
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its consequences using specious challenges.'0° The court concluded that Smith was
not prejudiced by the assignment from Cumberland to Mass because "Smith was free
to limit or restrict [the contract] but did not."' 09
B. The Scope of the Agreement to Arbitrate
After finding an arbitration agreement to be valid and binding, a court must
decide whether the parties intended for the dispute to fall within the scope of the
arbitration clause." 0
In City of Denver v. District Court of Denver, the city of Denver entered into
a series of contracts with PCL-Habert ("PCL"), a general contractor, to construct the
terminal building at Denver International Airport ("DIA")."' Under the terms of the
contract, PCL was to perform all of the work relating to the construction of the
terminal. "2 PCL subcontracted Corradini Corporation ("Corradini") to install
terrazzo flooring in the terminal building." '3 Thereafter, the city decided to change
the flooring material from terrazzo to a unique granite product which could only be
installed by Technomaiera SRL ("Technomaiera"), the exclusive producer of the
product.' Upon this action, PCL was forced to cancel its subcontract with
Corradini and to enter into an agreement with Technomaiera." 5
Soon thereafter, the city, PCL, and Corradini consummated a verbal settlement
agreement whereby the city would compensate Corradini and PCL for termination
of the Corradini subcontract." 6 Technomaiera was unable to perform a portion of
the.subcontract with PCL and appeared to be insolvent. 1 7 In meeting to discuss
Technomaiera's performance problems, the city urged PCL to continue working with
Technomaiera."5s To make this suggestion feasible; the city authorized PCL to
advance funds so that Technomaiera could fulfill its obligation. "9 The city verbally
agreed to reimburse PCL. 20 Other disputes arose between the parties, including a
disagreement in which the city contended that it was overbilled by PCL.'2'
Negotiations over these issues were ineffective, leading PCL to file a lawsuit and
request an administrative hearing pursuant to the arbitration clauses in the contract. 22
In determining whether a specific dispute falls within the scope of the
arbitration clause, the Supreme Court of Colorado stated that courts must ascertain
108. Id. at 1173.
109. Id. at 1174.
110. City of Denver v. District Court of Denver, 939 P.2d 1353, 1363 (Colo. 1997).
111. Id. at 1357.
112. Id.





118. Id. At this time, Denver was still committed to meeting the airport's initially scheduled opening
date. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. Denver denied the existence of this verbal agreement but the court accepted as true the
material facts as stated by PCL for the purposes of the opinion. Id. at n.3.
121. Id. at 1358.
122. Id. at 1358-59.
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the reasonable expectations of the parties by applying the language chosen by the
parties to the factual nature of the dispute.'"3 When broad or unrestricted arbitration
clauses are used, there is even a stronger presumption favoring arbitration.124 The
court noted that the basis of the claim asserted rather than the legal cause of action
pled should guide courts in making the determination as to the scope of the
arbitration clause.' 25 The court further noted that creative legal theories should not
be permitted to undermine the presumption favoring alternative means of dispute
resolution.'26 In reversing and remanding the trial court's denial of arbitration, the
court held that arbitration must be compelled unless the arbitration clause is in no
way susceptible to an interpretation that encompasses the subject matter of the
dispute.'27
The court acknowledged that parties may select alternatives to litigation which
amounts to parties choosing their own forum of dispute resolution.'28 The parties'
endeavor is usually for a nonjudicial adjudicator to make a private and practical
determination with maximum dispatch and at minimum expense. 2 9 In this vein, the
court noted that "it has long been the policy of the law to interfere as little as possible
with the freedom of consenting parties to achieve this objective."' 3 ° In so doing, the
court additionally held that the trial court must accord the parties a presumption in
favor of alternative dispute resolution and must resolve doubts about the arbitration
clause in favor of arbitration.'3
In Cecala v. Moore, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois resolved whether an Illinois statute preempted application of the U.A.A.1
2
In Cecala, prior to closing on a home purchase, the Moores executed and delivered
to the Cecalas a Residential Real Property Disclosure Report ("Disclosure Report")
as required by the Illinois Residential Real Property Disclosure Act.'3 3 In that report,
the Moores' recorded that they were unaware of any flooding problems in the
crawlspace or basement or of any material defects in the basement or foundation.
34
Nine days following the Cecalas occupation of the home, flooding occurred that
forced the Cecalas to pay for repairs and prevent recurring flooding.'35
The Cecalas claimed that the Moores violated the Disclosure Act by (1) failing
to disclose a material defect, (2) knowingly submitting false information in the
Disclosure Report, and (3) as a result of their reliance on the Moores' false and
untrue statements, they suffered injury. 3 6 The Moores moved to stay the judicial
proceeding pursuant to the mediation provision in the parties' contract and Section
123. Id. at 1363-64.




128. Id. at 1362-63.
129. Id. at 1363.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 982 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
133. Id. at 611; see 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 77/1-99 (West 1998).
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3 of the F.A.A. 3 7 Alternatively, the Cecala's argued that their complaint was based
on the Disclosure Report and the Moores' alleged violation of the Disclosure Act. 3
In particular, the Cecala's argued that completion and delivery of the allegedly false
Disclosure Report constituted a violation of the Illinois Disclosure Act which
provides its own remedy. 3 9 The Cecala's thus asserted that their claim was outside
the scope of the mediation clause because the it stemmed from Illinois statutory law,
not from the parties' contract. 40 In considering the potential conflict between the
F.A.A. and the U.A.A., the court noted that the F.A.A. did not apply to the parties'
contract for the sale of real estate because it did not evidence a transaction involving
interstate commerce.' 4' Consequently, the dispute was governed by state arbitration
law whereby the Illinois U.A.A. applied to the parties' contract. 42
The court stated that its job was to determine whether the contract dispute fell
within the scope of the mediation clause. 4 3 In so doing, the court noted that parties
are bound to arbitrate only those issues that the clear language of the agreement,
unextended by construction or implication, shows they have agreed to arbitrate.'4
The court further noted that generic clauses are those which state that they cover all
claims "arising out of' or "relating to" a contract. 145 Generic arbitration clauses are
regarded as being very broad and compel arbitration of issues not specifically
enumerated in a particular contract. '6 The court went on to hold that the complaint
clearly "arises out of the subject matter of the contract" and was within the scope of
the broad mediation clause. 47 In support of its holding, the court remarked that
without the contract, the Cecalas would not have purchased and occupied the home,
and there would be no damages upon which to base a statutory claim.14
In Samson v. Hartsville Hospital, Inc., the Tennessee Court of Appeals granted
a stay of further court proceedings pending arbitration of an employment dispute that
centered around a hospital's contract with one of its physicians. 49 The court stated
that the parties' contract clearly indicated their dispute was to be resolved by
arbitration. 50 In reinforcing its decision, the court noted that the strong public policy
favoring arbitration of disputes is reflected in the U.A.A., whereby courts generally
construe arbitration clauses liberally and resolve doubts in favor of arbitration.'
In Metro Construction Co., Inc. v. Cogun Industries, Inc., the Tennessee Court
of Appeals granted a motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration in a
137. Id. Under the mediation clause, the parties agreed that "any and all disputes or claims... arising
out of or relating to" the contract would be submitted to mediation. Id.; see 9 U.S.C. § 3 (West 1998).
138. Cecala, 982 F. Supp at 611.
139. Id. at 613.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 612.
142. Id.
143. Id.





149. No. 01-A-01-9609-CH-00430, 1997 WL 107167, at *1, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1997).
150. Id. at *4.
151. Id.
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construction contract dispute.'52 Although the court acknowledged that a party
cannot be required to submit a dispute to arbitration without the party's consent, the
court stated that the parties undoubtedly agreed to settle any controversies or claims
arising out of or related to the contract by arbitration.'
C. Discovery and the Motion to Compel Arbitration
In Southeast Drilling & Blasting Services, Inc. v. BRS Construction Co., the
Tennessee Court of Appeals decided that discovery should be stayed pending
resolution of a motion to compel arbitration. 154 The court stated that Tennessee's
version of the U.A.A. establishes that the normal course of proceedings is to first
resolve the issue of whether the parties should be required to arbitrate.' 5  "All other
proceedings involving the merits, including discovery, should be stayed pending this
determination."' 56 The court recognized that some discovery may be necessary to
enable the trial court to properly determine if the motion to compel arbitration should
be granted, but such discovery should be limited to matters relevant to the motion
to compel. 1
5 7
D. Scope of the Agreement to Arbitrate
involving Multiple Parties
To maximize the advantages typically associated with alternative dispute
resolution, courts in multiparty litigation often will refuse to enforce arbitration
clauses that create delay while also amplifying complexity and costs. 5 ' The Illinois
Court of Appeals emphasized in Iko that arbitration should not be compelled where
it would hinder judicial economy or afford no benefit in the underlying lawsuit. 5 9
In Iko, the Board was charged with the maintenance of the common elements of a
multi-unit condominium development, which included upkeep of the roof."o The
Board commenced the underlying action against four developers, including Zale,
seeking damages for alleged roof defects in the design and construction of the
condominium development.' 61 Zale then filed a third-party complaint against seven
other contractors who performed portions of the roof work, including Johnston
Associates ("Johnston"). 162
152. No. 02A01-9608-CH-00207, 1997 WL 538914, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 1997).
153. Id.
154. No. 01A01-9706-CH-00272, 1997 WL 399387, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 16, 1997).
155. Id. at *2.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Board of Managers of the Courtyards v. Iko Mfg., Inc., 681 N.E.2d 102 (Il1. App. Ct. 1997).
159. Id. at 106.
160. Id. at 103-04.
161. Id. at 104. The Board advanced theories against Zale based on express and implied warranties.
Id.
162. Id. Zale premised their third-party action solely on theories of conditional contribution or
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Based upon the arbitration provision contained in its contract with Zale,
Johnston filed a written demand for arbitration along with a motion to compel
arbitration and stay the third-party claims against it pursuant to Section 2(a) of
Illinois Arbitration Act.1 63 Zale argued that the motion should be denied because the
issues were inextricably intertwined such that the issues could not be severed.'
64
Zale further asserted that because it did not create the multiplicity of parties in the
litigation, its claim against Johnston could not proceed without a prior determination
of its liability to the Board, and the public policy favoring joinder of claims in a
single proceeding outweighed the policy favoring arbitration. 65 In response,
Johnston simply insisted that since no dispute existed regarding the existence of an
arbitration agreement, the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act mandated that a court
order arbitration. 66
The Illinois Court of Appeals held that Zale's claims against Johnston were
expressly contingent on and derivative of the Board's claims against Zale.167 The
court noted that all of the first and third party claims arose out of the same
construction project, related to the same alleged defects, and involved the design of
Johnston. 68  The court further observed that there were inextricable
interrelationships between the issues and parties, thus Johnston's claims should not
be severed from the underlying lawsuit pending arbitration. 69 The court concluded
that a separate arbitration proceeding would create increased cost and
inefficiencies. 70 In so doing, the court noted that the purpose of a third-party action
is to determine the rights and liabilities of all parties before a single tribunal and
upon the same evidence.'
7
'
E. Scope of the Agreement to Arbitrate and Contracts with
Reference to Insurance
In Towe, Hester & Erwin, Inc., v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,
a licensed insurance agency sued a group of affiliated non-resident insurance
companies ("Continental") connected with Towe, Hester, & Erwin, Inc. ("THE")
through an agency relationship. 172 THE alleged that it was forced to sign a
"Rehabilitation Program" agreement under threat of immediate termination of their
agency agreement. 73  THE further alleged that the Rehabilitation Program
Agreement was not part of, or subject to, the arbitration clause in the agency
163. Id.; 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 (West 1994).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 105.





172. 947 P.2d 594, 595 (Ok. Ct. App. 1997).
173. Id.
[Vol. 1998, No. 2
14
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1998, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1998/iss2/8
The Uniform Arbitration Act
agreement.'74 Continental answered the lawsuit by denying any wrongdoing and
argued that the parties had agreed that unresolved disputes arising in connection with
the agency agreements would be submitted to arbitration.'75 Continental then filed
two applications to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration, the first grounded
on the Oklahoma Uniform Arbitration Act, and the second filed pursuant to the
Federal Arbitration Act.1
7 6
In reversing the trial court's denial of Continental's motions, the Oklahoma
Court of Civil Appeals held that because the Federal Arbitration Act applied directly,
there was no need to examine Oklahoma's Uniform Arbitration Act. 7 THE argued
that the F.A.A. was inapplicable because its claims were sufficient for revocation of
a contract on legal or equitable grounds.' The court countered by pointing out that
the federal scheme allows adjudication only if the claim is fraud in the inducement
of the arbitration clause itself, an issue which goes to the making of the agreement.'
7 1
THE's primary argument, however, was that arbitration was precluded by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act in that the F.A.A. may not be interpreted to allow
arbitration of insurance disputes if a state law specifically prohibits such
arbitration.8 The Oklahoma Uniform Arbitration Act regulating the business of
insurance provides as follows: "This act shall not apply to collective bargaining
agreements or contracts with reference to insurance except for those contracts
between insurance companies.''. The court acknowledged that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act granted Oklahoma the exclusive right to regulate "the business of
insurance" in Oklahoma.1 2 If the state attempts, however, to regulate subjects
tangential to "the business of insurance," the state moves outside of its exclusive
arena.8 3 Furthermore, if the regulation becomes one relating to commerce, the
F.A.A. will preempt state law.
184
In arriving at its decision, the court adopted the reasoning promulgated by the
United States Supreme Court in Union Labor Life Insurance Company v. Pireno.18
In cases construing the term "contracts with reference to insurance," the court
requires (1) the subject matter of the regulation to transfer or spread a policyholder's
risk, (2) deal with an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and
174. Id. The agency agreements between the parties contained prominent and detailed arbitration
provisions. Section IX included the following language: "if any dispute or disagreement shall arise in
connection with this Agreement that cannot be resolved by the parties, the matter shall be submitted to
arbitration." Id. at 596.
175. Id. at 595.
176. Id. at 596; see 9 U.S.C. § I (West 1998).
177. Towe, Hester & Erwin, Inc., 947 P.2d at 596.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 597. The McCarran-Ferguson Act generally governs the regulation of insurance to the
states and prohibits Congress from passing laws which supersede any state law "regulating the business
of insurance." Id.
181. Towe, Hester & Erwin, Inc., 947 P.2d at 597; see OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 802 (1997).
182. Id. at 598. A state may decide in its arbitration statute what insurance matters are subject to
arbitration. Id. at 598-99.
183. Id. at 599.
184. Id.
185. Id. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
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the insured, and (3) be limited to entities within the insurance industry.'1 6 Using
these factors, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reasoned that contracts between
an insurer and its employees or independent contractors are not "contracts with
reference to insurance," and arbitration provisions in such contracts are not excluded
from application of the F.A.A.'87
IV. SECTION 7: WITNESSES, SUBPOENAS, DEPOSITIONS
Section 7 of the U.A.A. sets forth the powers of the arbitrator with regard to
procuring a witness or evidence for a hearing.8 8 These powers are identical to the
powers a judge would have if the case were being heard in a court of law instead of
by an independent tribunal. They include (1) the ability to subpoena witnesses,
books, records, documents, and the power to administer oaths; (2) the ability to
permit depositions; (3) the power to invoke laws compelling a witness to testify; and
(4) the power to allow fees for an expert witness.' 89
One consequence of Section 7 is that an arbitration hearing may be privileged
against defamatory liability. In Bushell v. Caterpillar, Inc. the Illinois Court of
Appeals used the adjudicative nature of the arbitration hearing to label it a quasi-
judicial proceeding.'9 Employee Bushell and employer Caterpillar submitted their
wrongful termination dispute to arbitration. 9' At the hearing, representatives of
Caterpillar testified that "plaintiff [Bushell] slept on the job and falsified
employment records."' 92 In response, Bushell filed a separate action in Illinois state
court claiming that these remarks were defamatory and had injured him.' 93 He did
so despite the fact that Illinois law privileges statements made in judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings. 194
The appellate court held that the arbitration hearing was a quasi-judicial
proceeding because Section 7 of the U.A.A. allows presentation of evidence, cross
examination of witnesses, and the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths.' 95
Therefore, statements made within the hearing were privileged against liability for
defamation.'96 The court was quick to point out that an arbitration proceeding not




188. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7.
189. Id.
190. 683 N.E.2d 1286 (III. Ct. App. 1997). For Illinois' version of§ 7 see 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7
(West 1961).
191. Bushell, 683 N.E.2d at 1287.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Parrillo, Weiss & Moss v. Cashion, 537 N.E.2d 851, 854 (111. Ct. App. 1989).
195. Bushell, 683 N.E.2d at 1288-89.
196. Id. at 1289.
197. Id. at 1288.
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V. SECTION 9: CHANGE OF AWARD BY ARBITRATORS
Section 9 of the U.A.A. sets forth the process by which a party or a reviewing
court can request a clarification of an award by the arbitrators.' 9' It provides a
twenty day deadline after delivery of the initial award by which a party must submit
its application for clarification. 99 No such time limit exists for a reviewing court.
When a court finds that an arbitrator's award is ambiguous, the correct action
is to request a clarification under Section 9 from the original arbitrator. The
reviewing court shall not review the merits of the case. 2°° In Menahga Education
Association v. Menahga Independent School District No. 821, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded a lower court decision that looked at the merits
of a case in interpreting an ambiguous arbitration award.2 ' The dispute between the
Menahga Education Association ("Union") and Menahga Independent School
District ("School District") centered on whether their contract allowed the School
District to withhold salary increases from teachers.20 2 The arbitrator issued a three
part decision: (1) the School District had the right to modify the salary schedule of
teachers, (2) the School District did not have the right to withhold advancement of
teachers as a group on the salary schedule, and (3) the School District had the right
to withhold advancement of teachers on the salary schedule on an individual basis
for just cause.20 3 The School District interpreted this decision to allow for
modification of all teachers' salaries.2°4 The Union contested the interpretation in
district court.2 5 After review, the district court confirmed the arbitration award in
favor of the Union and found on the merits that the School District did not have the
right to withhold teachers' salary increases.2 6
Upon review, the appellate court found that the arbitration award was
ambiguous in that there were two reasonable and conflicting interpretations of the
award.207 Therefore, under Section 9 of the U.A.A. the district court should have
remanded the award to the arbitrator for clarification instead of issuing its own
finding based on what it perceived the agreement to allow.20 8
198. UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT § 9.
199. Id.
200. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-99 (1960).
201. 568 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). The court applied MINN. STAT. § 572.16, subd. 2
(1986), which reads:
If an application to the court is pending under section 572.18, 572.19, or 572.20, on
submission to the arbitrators by the court under such conditions as the court may order, the
arbitrators may modify or correct the award upon the grounds stated in section 572.20,
subdivision 1, or for the purpose of clarifying the award.
202. Id. at 865.
203. Id. at 867.
204. Id. at 868.
205. Id. at 865.
206. Id. at 866.
207. Id. at 868.
208. Id. at 870.
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VI. SECTION 11: CONFIRMATION OF AN AWARD
Section 11 of the U.A.A. provides that a court shall confirm an award unless
a timely motion to vacate, modify, or correct is made.' °9 Confirmation turns the
arbitrator's award into a judicial ruling, thus giving the victor all the judicial
remedies available to enforce the award. In Chicago Southshore & South Bend
Railroad v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District, the Appellate
Court of Illinois held that by agreeing to submit disputes to arbitration, a party that
normally enjoys sovereign immunity has agreed to be sued in court to confirm the
arbitration award under Section 11 10
In Chicago Southshore, the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District
("NICTD") was found liable by an arbitration panel for damages resulting from the
exercise of its proprietary and governmental functions.2 1' When Chicago Southshore
and South Bend Railroad attempted to have the award confirmed in Illinois state
court pursuant to Section 11, however, the NICTD asserted that as a state agency of
Indiana, it is immune from suit outside the state of Indiana under Article 4 of the
Constitution of the State of Indiana."' The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the motion under Section 1 .213 It held that by agreeing to settle
disputes in the arbitration forum, NICTD had agreed to be sued in any court of law
for confirmation of the arbitration award and had thereby waived its immunity. 14
VII. SECTION 12: VACATING AN AWARD
Arbitration is meant to provide parties with a reliable, expeditious, and fair
alternative to litigation.215 In an effort to "facilitate this purpose, judicial review of
arbitration awards is very narrow in scope. '2 16 The goal of the U.A.A. and the courts
in interpreting the U.A.A. is to "prevent arbitration [from] becoming another layer
in the litigation process., 217 Accordingly, Section 12 of the U.A.A. "restricts courts
from vacating an arbitration award under any circumstances unless there are
'allegations of fraud, partiality, misconduct, excess of powers, or technical problems
in making the award."'
218
209. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1I.
210. 682 N.E.2d 156 (111. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 703 N.E.2d 7 (111. 1998). For
Illinois' version of§ I 1 see 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11 (West 1991).
211. Chicago Southshore, 682 N.E.2d at 158.
212. Id. at 162. Article 4, section 24 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana provides as follows:
"Provisions may be made, by general law, for bringing suit against the State; but no special law
authorizing such suit to be brought, or making compensation to any person claiming damages against
the State shall ever be passed." IND. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (1984).
213. Chicago Southshore, 682 N.E.2d at 161-62.
214. Id.
215. Bopp v. Brames, 677 N.E.2d 629 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
216. Id. at 631.
217. Springfield Teachers Ass'n v. Springfield Sch. Dirs., 705 A.2d 541, 546 (Vt. 1997).
218. Medina v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., Inc., 940 P.2d 1175, 1178 (N.M. 1997).
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A. Procurement of Award by Corruption, Fraud or Other Undue Means
Section 12 of the U.A.A. requires a court to vacate an award that was "procured
by corruption, fraud or other undue means. 21 9 Courts exercise "[e]very reasonable
presumption... in favor of the finality and validity of the arbitration award."220
In Medina v. Foundation Reserve Insurance Co., Inc. the Supreme Court of
New Mexico vacated an arbitration award and ordered a rehearing before a new
panel of arbitrators on the ground that the award was procured by Medina's fraud,
corruption, and undue means.22' In reviewing an arbitration award, a court must
determine whether:
[S]ubstantial evidence in the record supports the district court's findings of
fact and application of law, taking all evidence in the light most favorable
to upholding the arbitration award . . . .Substantial evidence is that
evidence which is relevant and which a reasonable mind could accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.222
In examining the evidence, it is the duty of the party moving to vacate to show why
the evidence, presented in the light most favorable to the arbitrator's finding, does
not support that finding.223
The Medina court disagreed with the district court's determination that Medina's
conduct did constitute fraud 224 and held that there was substantial evidence in the
record to support the district court's determination that Medina concealed and
withheld material documents and information and, thereby, "obtained the award
through false and perjured testimony and by concealing and withholding material
documents and information., 225 Therefore, the court held that Medina's actions were
sufficient to constitute fraud.226
In International Union of Operating Engineers v. Independent School District,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals reiterated that "[e]very reasonable presumption must
be exercised in favor of the finality and validity of the arbitration award.
22 7
According to the court, an arbitration award is subject to "extremely narrow"
scrutiny.22s Orville McCormick, a member of the International Union of Operating
Engineers, was dismissed as a custodial engineer for the Independent School District
219. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12.
220. International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Independent Sch. Dist., No. C5-97-536, 1997 WL
527250, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1997).
221. 940 P.2d 1175, 1179 (N.M. 1997). See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-12 (Michie 1978) for New
Mexico's adoption of Section 12 of the U.A.A.
222. 940 P.2d at 1178.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1177.
225. Id. at 1179. In claiming uninsured motorist benefits, Medina misrepresented his ability to work,
his psychological and physical condition, and lied about his work history. Id. at 1176, 1179.
226. Id. at 1179.
227. No. C5-97-536, 1997 WL 527250, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1997). See MINN. STAT. §
572.19 (1996) for Minnesota's adoption of Section 12 of the U.A.A.
228. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 1997 WL 527250, at *2.
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after he was convicted of a felony.229 In the arbitration proceeding following his
termination, McCormick testified that his felony conviction would be reduced to a
misdemeanor and that he would be discharged from probation. The effectiveness of
the arbitration award was contingent upon the promised reduction.23 In January
1996, the arbitrator upheld McCormick's termination because his felony conviction
had not been reduced and McCormick was still on probation."' In April 1996, the
union moved to have the award confirmed after McCormick's conviction was finally
reduced and he was discharged from probation.232 The school district claimed that
McCormick committed fraud by representing that the "discharge from probation and
reduction in sentence would occur in June 1995".233 Although the school district
claimed not to have discovered the alleged fraud until after the ninety day time limit
to apply for a vacatur of the award expired, the court held that the time limit still
governed because the school district did not apply for vacatur within ninety days
after the discovery of the alleged fraud.234
B. Partiality, Corruption, or Misconduct of the Arbitrator
In an effort to ensure that all parties receive a fair hearing, arbitrators are
required to maintain impartiality.235 Courts must vacate an award if there is "evident
partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the
arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any of the parties. ,236
In Bopp v. Brames, Bopp argued that the arbitration award itself demonstrated
that the arbitrators were partial and biased against him.237 Since "evident partiality"
is not defined in the statute,238 the Indiana Court of Appeals construed Section 12 "to
effectuate [the U.A.A.'s] general purpose to make uniform the law of those states
which enact similar arbitration statutes. 239 The court adopted the following test for
partiality sufficient for vacatur:
a party must show interest or bias that is direct, definite and capable of
demonstration; proof of partiality may not be remote, uncertain or
speculative. . . . Stated another way, when [the court] review[s] an
arbitration award for evident partiality, [the court] decide[s] whether the
arbitration proceedings were fundamentally unfair.24 0




233. Id. at *2.
234. Id.
235. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12.
236. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12.
237. 677 N.E.2d 629, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
238. See IND. CODE § 34-4-2-21 (1997) for Indiana's adoption of Section 12 of the U.A.A.
239. Bopp, 677 N.E.2d at 633.
240. Id. Indiana's alternative dispute resolution rules help define partiality by providing that: A
neutral may not have an interest in the outcome of the dispute, may not be an employee of any of the
parties or attorneys involved in the dispute, and may not be related to any of the parties or attorneys in
the dispute. Id. at 633; see IND. CODE § 34-4-2-21 (1997).
[Vol. 1998, No. 2
20
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1998, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1998/iss2/8
The Uniform Arbitration Act
The court concluded that the findings of fact or the size of the award alone did
not raise an inference of partiality.24" ' Further, the fact that the relief granted was
within the scope of the arbitration agreement cut against the assertion of partiality.242
Ultimately the court concluded that the assertion of partiality was unfounded and
stated that Bopp was entitled to a fair proceeding, not a favorable result.
4 3
C. Arbitrator Exceeding the Scope ofAuthority
Section 12 provides that courts must vacate an award if the "arbitrators
exceeded their powers."2' " Parties frequently contend that the arbitrators exceeded
the scope of their authority in formulating a remedy or in deciding an issue. The
courts often look to the agreement to arbitrate to determine the proper scope of the
arbitrator's authority.245
1. Arbitrator Did Not Exceed Scope ofAuthority
In Heatherly v. Rodman & Renshaw, Heatherly asserted that the arbitrator
exceeded the scope of her authority by not awarding him attorney fees, even though
he conceded that the arbitrator had authority to decide the issue.246 In reaching its
decision, the court stated, "It follows that, because [Heatherly] disputes only the
result reached by the arbitrator, not her authority to act, we must reject his contention
that the arbitrator exceeded her authority in deciding his claim for attorney fees."247
In Bopp v. Brames, the Indiana Court of Appeals considered whether the
arbitrators exceeded the scope of their authority and whether the arbitrators exhibited
"evident partiality. 2 4 The court adopted the approach that arbitration awards
should be reviewed narrowly and that the party seeking vacatur bears the burden of
proving the grounds asserted.249 In this case Bopp contended that the arbitrators
exceeded their scope of authority when they issued relief outside the scope of the
arbitration agreement. 5 When an award is attacked under the U.A.A. on the ground
that the arbitrators exceeded their powers through erroneous interpretation of
contract, the reviewing court determines whether the arbitrators' construction of the
contract "is a reasonably possible one that can seriously be made in the context in
which the contract was made. 25' The court determined that the arbitrators'
241. Bopp, 677 N.E.2d at 633-34.
242. Id. at 634.
243. Id.
244. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12.
245. See Roosa v. Tillotson, 695 A.2d 1196 (Me. 1997).
246. 678 N.E.2d 59, 61 (III. App. Ct. 1997). See 170 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/12 (West 1994) for Illinois'
adoption of Section 12 of the U.A.A.
247. Id.
248. 667 N.E.2d 629, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
249. Id. at 631.
250. Id.
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interpretation of the agreement was reasonable, and that Bopp failed to demonstrate
that the arbitrators exceeded their authority.252
In Padilla v. D.E. Frey & Co., Inc., the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the
arbitrators' award of punitive damages did not exceed their scope of authority." 3 A
Colorado statute provides that arbitrators are prohibited from awarding punitive
damages "unless otherwise provided by law. "2m The court held that statutory rights,
including the right not to have an issue arbitrated, may be waived.25' By agreeing
to arbitrate under the rules of the NASD ("National Association of Securities
Dealers"), D.E. Frey granted the arbitrators the ability to award "damages and other
relief., 256 After Padilla filed his statement requesting punitive damages, D.E. Frey
"did not challenge his right to recover punitive damages through arbitration
proceedings or seek to bring the proceedings within the Colorado Arbitration Act. '257
In Stahulak v. City of Chicago, the Illinois Court of Appeals held that despite
the extremely narrow review of an arbitrator's award and the limited scope of
authority to grant relief based on the arbitration agreement, "the arbitrator must have
flexibility in formulating a remedy to meet a wide variety of situations [that] the
drafters of [a collective bargaining agreement] never... [contemplated]."258 In this
case, the arbitrator's reinstatement of the plaintiff was proper because it met the
standard of contract law which requires that the injured party be put into a position
that she "would have occupied if the contract had been performed, not a better
position. '
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in LCI, Inc. v. Chipman, affirmed an award on the
ground that the arbitrators did not exceed their scope of authority by addressing the
breach of covenant issue and relying on insufficient evidence to support the award.2 6
The court first addressed whether breach of covenant was beyond the scope of
arbitration.26' If so, the arbitrators exceeded their powers by addressing it.262 The
court refused to vacate the award because the arbitrator did not exceed his powers
and properly decided the issue.263 In coming to its decision, the court relied on the
evidence presented as well as a "broad view of the scope of arbitration. ' '264 The court
then considered whether the "penalty" award was properly within the scope of
arbitration.2 65 The court determined that the award was compensatory, not punitive,
and therefore fell within the scope of arbitration.266
252. Id. at 632-33.
253. 939 P.2d 474, 477 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997). See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-214 (1987) for
Colorado's adoption of Section 12 of the U.A.A.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 478.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. 684 N.E.2d 907,912 (Il. App. Ct. 1997).
259. Id. at 913.
260. 572 N.W. 2d 158, 160-62 (Iowa 1997). See IOWA CODE § 679A.12 (1997) for Iowa's adoption
of Section 12 of the U.A.A.
261. LCI, Inc., 572 N.W.2d at 159-60.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 160.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 160-61.
266. Id. at 161.
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LCI further argued that the arbitrators exceeded their powers by rendering an
award without sufficient supporting evidence.2 67 At common law, and under the
U.A.A., insufficient evidence is not grounds for vacatur of an award.2 6' The Iowa
legislature, however, has modified this rule by providing that if "[s]ubstantial
evidence on the record as a whole does not support the award" the award must be
vacated.2 69 According to the court, "evidence is substantial if a reasonable person
would accept it as sufficient to reach a conclusion. 2 70 Under such a standard the
review of an arbitration award is like judicial review of a jury verdict.271' After
reviewing the evidence the court concluded that it was of sufficient weight to support
the award.272
The court made an additional observation and commented that a high degree
of scrutiny of arbitration awards would be "inconsistent with the rationale underlying
the concept of arbitration., 273 The court stated that "[a] refined quality of justice is
not the goal in arbitration matters. Indeed such a goal is deliberately sacrificed in
favor of a sure and speedy resolution.,
274
2. Arbitrator Did Exceed Scope of Authority
In Roosa v. Tillotson, the Supreme Court of Maine determined that the
arbitrator exceeded the scope of her authority because the parties did not agree to
arbitrate. 275 The court stated that for a dispute to be subject to arbitration, both
parties must generally agree to arbitrate and present a claim that appears to be
encompassed by the arbitration agreement.276 The court determined that there was
no agreement to arbitrate between Roosa and Tillotson and vacated the award.277
In Pittman Mortgage Co., Inc. v. Edwards, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina vacated a portion of an award because the arbitrators exceeded their powers
by resolving an issue not within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate.278
According to the court, an award must be supported if the grounds "can be inferred
from the facts [and if the] factual inferences and legal conclusions supporting the
award are barely colorable. 279 In this case the pleadings represented the arbitration
agreement and limited the arbitrators authority to render relief.2 0 The requested
relief was the issuance of stock, but the arbitrators awarded Edwards the value of the
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. See IOWA CODE § 679A.12 (1997) for Iowa's adoption of Section 12 of the U.A.A.
270. LCI, Inc., 572 N.W.2d at 161.
271. Id. at 162 (quoting 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 162, at 430 (1975)).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. (quoting Reicks v. Farmers Commodities Corp., 474 N.W.2d 809, 811 (Iowa 1991)).
275. 695 A.2d, 1196, 1198 (Me. 1997). See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 5938 (West 1980) for
Maine's adoption of Section 12 of the U.A.A.
276. Id. at 1197.
277. Id. at 1198.
278. 488 S.E. 2d 335, 338 (S.C. 1997). See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-130 (Law Co-op. 1996) for





Byrd et al.: Byrd: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
stock, thereby exceeding their powers. 8' The court also held that the arbitrators
further exceeded their authority by holding Pittman Mortgage Company personally
liable for the value of the stock, but not the unpaid income.282
In Smith v. Waller, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that despite the fact
that an arbitration award "is not subject to the preponderant evidence standard of
review, and moreover, that it is not subject to vacatur for a mere mistake of fact or
law," the arbitrator in this case exceeded the scope of her authority by awarding
attorney fees.283 The court held that "[a]rbitrators do not have carte blanch powers"
and are bound by the arbitration agreement when rendering an award.28 4 Since
neither the lease nor the U.A.A. provided for an award of attorney fees, the arbitrator
exceeded her scope of authority by awarding them. 8 '
In MGA Insurance Co. v. Bakos, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated
an arbitration award on the grounds that the trial court applied an overly narrow
common law arbitration standard of review. 28 6 Under Pennsylvania common law
arbitration, an award 'is binding and may not be vacated or modified unless it is
clearly shown that a party was denied a hearing or that fraud, misconduct, corruption
or other irregularity caused the rendition of an unjust, inequitable or unconscionable
award.' 287 The Superior Court found that such a narrow application constituted an
error as a matter of law.288 The court remanded the case for review in accordance
with statutory arbitration principles, rather than those of common law arbitration. 289
In Geissler v. Sanem, the Montana Supreme Court addressed an issue of first
impression: what type of arbitrator misconduct constitutes exceeding the scope of
authority and justifies vacatur of an award?2 ° The court began by restating the
principle that the judiciary's power of review is limited and does not permit scrutiny
that would rise to the level of review of the merits of the case.2 9' The court,
however, held that despite any case law to the contrary, the appropriate standard of
review in future cases included the power to review awards for manifest disregard
of the law.292 "[A]s a matter of public policy and based upon a court's independent
responsibility, a court cannot have such limited authority in its review that it is
forced to ignore an arbitrator's manifest disregard of Montana law."'2 93 Manifest
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. No. 03A01-9704-CH-001 27, 1997 WL 412537, at "1-2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 24, 1997). See
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-313 (1983) for Tennessee's adoption of Section 12 of the U.A.A. But see
discussion infra Part E (Heatherly v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 678 N.E.2d 59 (I11. App. Ct. 1997)
(failure to award attorney fees does not violate public policy)).
284. Smith, 1997 WL 412537, at *2.
285. Id. at *1-2.
286. 699 A.2d 751, 753 (Pa. 1997). See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7317 (1985) for Pennsylvania's
adoption of Section 12 of the U.A.A.
287. MGA Ins. Co., 699 A.2d at 753 n.5 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7341 (1982)).
288. Id. at 753.
289. Id. at 753-55. Pennsylvania's statutory arbitration principles are the same as those found in
Section 12 of the U.A.A. Id.
290. 949 P.2d 234, 236 (Mont. 1997). See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-312 (1997) for Montana's
adoption of Section 12 of the U.A.A.
291. Geissler, 949 P.2d at 236.
292. Id. at 237-38.
293. Id. at 237.
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disregard of the law, according to the court, consists of more than simple
misapplication of the law, and requires a blatant refusal to follow it.2 94 The court
adopted the second circuit test for manifest disregard of the law, stating that vacatur
requires that the "arbitrator [appreciate] the existence of a clearly governing legal
principle but... ignore[s] or pay[s] no attention to it."'295 Under the facts of the case,
the court was unable to conclude that the arbitrators clearly ignored applicable
law.296
In Crawford County v. AFSCME District Council, the Commonwealth Court
of Pennsylvania applied the 'essence test"' to determine whether the arbitrator
exceeded the scope of his authority by reinstating a correctional officer once the
arbitrator found just cause for disciplining the officer.297 Under the "essence test,"
a court can "only reverse an arbitrator if, after viewing all the evidence, and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party, there is insufficient evidence to support the elements of the claim or defense
as a matter of law."298 The arbitrator has the authority to determine if just cause
exists for the disciplining of a public employee under a collective bargaining
agreement if the agreement does not define the meaning of just cause and there are
no published rules or regulations.299 Once the arbitrator determines that just cause
exists, the discipline imposed cannot be overturned by a reviewing court.3°° In this
case, once the arbitrator determined that just cause existed, "the inquiry had to end
and the disciplinary action of the County had to be accepted."30 1 The arbitrator,
therefore, acted in a manifestly unreasonable manner by modifying the disciplinary
action taken, and the court vacated the arbitration award.
30 2
D. Application for Vacatur ofAward Within Ninety Days
In order to facilitate the finality and reliability of arbitration awards, the U.A.A.
imposes a ninety day time limit to file an application for vacatur. 0 3 This provision
is strictly construed to effectuate the U.A.A.'s purpose.'
04
In Medina v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., Inc., the Supreme Court of New
Mexico held that where the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Arbitration Act conflict
with regard to the time limit for filing for vacatur, the Arbitration Act provision
governs.3 0 ' The court viewed the Arbitration Act as a "special statutory proceeding
294. Id. at 237-38.
295. Id. at 238-39 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34
(2d Cir. 1986)).
296. Id. at 239.
297. 693 A.2d 1385, 1393 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997), appeal denied, 704 A.2d 1383 (Pa. 1997).
298. Id. at 1389.
299. Id. at 1391-92.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1393.
302. Id. at 1393-94.
303. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12. Some states have reduced the time limit to thirty days. See
Springfield Teachers Ass'n v. Springfield Sch. Dirs., 705 A.2d 541 (Vt. 1997).
304. See Springfield Teachers Ass'n, 705 A.2d at 541.
305. 940 P.2d 1175, 1178 (N.M. 1997). The Rules of Civil Procedure allow the court to set aside a
judgment within one year after its entry. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
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which requires finality of an award in order to achieve the purpose behind the
Act."3'06 In order to effectuate the Act's purpose, the court should have applied the
Arbitration Act and vacated the award instead of applying the Rules of Civil
Procedure and determining that Foundation Reserve Insurance Co. did not file a
timely application for vacatur. °7
In Chicago Southshore v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District,
the Illinois Court of Appeals refused to consider Northern Indiana's substantive
arguments in favor of vacating the award because they were not raised within the
ninety day time limit of Section 12(b) of the U.A.A.3°" According to the court, the
filing of a petition to confirm an award does not effect the rule that the petition for
vacatur must be filed within ninety days after the delivery of the copy of the
award.3" Therefore, any arguments to vacate an award must be raised within ninety
days after delivery of the award to be considered timely regardless of when the
petition to confirm was filed.31° Since Northern Indiana did not abide by the ninety
day time limit, the petition for vacatur was time-barred.3 '
In Caron v. Reliance Insurance Co., the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
reviewed the trial court's decision to deny Reliance Insurance's request to file a
petition to vacate an arbitration award after the statutory thirty day time limit.3 2 The
trial court denied the petition after determining that the failure to file a timely motion
for vacatur was the result of negligence on the part of Reliance Insurance's
counsel. 3 3 The court articulated that "[e]xtensions of time will only be granted in
cases where there is fraud or some breakdown in the court's operation. 3 4 The court
upheld the trial court's decision on the grounds that the trial court had discretion to
determine whether to grant an extension and that no other basis for reversal
existed.315 As a result, Reliance Insurance waived any issue related to the decision
of the arbitrator by failing to file a motion to vacate within the thirty day time
limit.3
16
In Springfield Teachers Association v. Springfield School Directors, the
Springfield School Directors argued that affirmative defenses and claims that an
arbitrator exceeded her jurisdiction were not subject to the thirty day time limit for
motions to vacate imposed by the Vermont Arbitration Act ("V.A.A."). 317 In order
to effectuate the purpose of the V.A.A., the Vermont Supreme Court refused to
construe the statute as exempting affirmative defenses to a motion to confirm an
306. Medina, 940 P.2d at 1178.
307. Id.
308. 682 N.E.2d 156, 162 (III. App. Ct. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 703 N.E.2d 7 (111. 1998).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 163.
312. 703 A.2d 63, 64 (Pa. 1997). Pennsylvania adopted a thirty day time limit rather than the
U.A.A.'s ninety day time limit. Id.; see 42 PA.CONS. STAT. § 7314(b) (1982).
313. Caron, 703 A.2d at 64.
314. Id. at 65.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. 705 A.2d 541, 546 (Vt. 1997). Unlike the U.A.A., Vermont has chosen a thirty day time limit
for motions to vacate in VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5677 (1995).
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award and jurisdictional claims from the thirty day time limit.318 The court stated
that "the usefulness of arbitration is undermined if issues can be withheld from the
arbitrator and raised for the first time in court long after the arbitration is over.""3 9
1. Public Policy
Courts will depart from the U.A.A.'s articulated grounds for vacatur only when
an arbitration award is contrary to what the court determines to be a "well-defined
and dominant" public policy.320 In determining if such a public policy violation
exists, the courts narrowly construe what is to be considered a "well-defined and
dominant" public policy. 2'
In Heatherly v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., the Illinois Court of Appeals held
that the "failure to award attorney fees in an action for wages due [did] not arise to
the level of the sort of immoral or illegal acts that are so repugnant to public policy
that an arbitration award based upon them must be vacated." '322 The court recognized
that the public policy exception is extremely narrow and should only be applied
when a public policy violation is clearly demonstrated.3 23 The court applied a two-
step analysis to determine whether the arbitration award violated public policy.
324
The court first determined whether a "'well-defined and dominant' public policy
[could] be identified," and if so, "whether the award violated the policy."'3 25 The
court held that the mere existence of public policy considerations in a statute is not
sufficient to define the policy as well-defined and dominant because doing so would
permit too broad of a judicial review.326 Such a construction would permit a vacatur
where the arbitrator simply misapplied the statute and would violate the principle
that a mistake of law is not sufficient grounds to vacate an award.327 In applying the
test the court determined that Heatherly's appeal failed to identify the well-defined
and dominant public policy but argued instead that the arbitrator misinterpreted the
statute.328 Therefore, further inquiry under the second prong was unnecessary. 29
VIII. SECTION 13: MODIFICATION OR CORRECTION OF AWARD
Section 13 of the Uniform Arbitration Act sets forth three situations in which
a confirming court shall modify or correct an arbitrator's award: (1) where it is clear
that the arbitrator miscalculated figures, or incorrectly described a person, property
or thing referred to in the award; (2) the arbitrator awarded upon a matter not
318. Springfield Teachers Ass 'n, 705 A.2d at 546.
319. Id. at 547.
320. See Heatherly v. Rodman & Renshaw, 678 N.E.2d 59 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
321. See Id.
322. 678 N.E.2d 59, 63 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
323. Id. at 62.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 62-63.
327. Id. at 63.
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submitted to arbitration; or (3) the award is somehow imperfect as a matter of
form.330 A party's application for modification is subject to a ninety day statute of
limitations.33 '
At least one court has applied situation (2) very loosely. In Kutch v. State Farm
Mutual Insurance Company, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that after the statute
of limitations runs, an insurer may still allege as a defense in a confirmation hearing
that maximum insurance policy limits were exceeded by the award.332 This is true
despite the fact that the policy limits were not brought up as an issue during the
arbitration proceeding.333 The court concluded that Section 13 did not provide
grounds upon which State Farm could bring its objection regarding the extent of
coverage, and therefore did not apply.334
This holding seems to be in direct conflict with other courts' interpretations of
Section 13. In Smith v. Waller335 and Chicago Southshore,336 courts held that the
statute of limitations is inflexible based on the plain meaning of the words. The
plain language states that a court can modify within ninety days "if the arbitrators
have awarded on a matter not submitted to them. 33 7 One could argue that in Kutch
the maximum amount allowable under the policy was a matter not submitted to the
arbitrator, and, therefore, the insurance company's argument falls under the statute
and is subject to the statute of limitations. One could also argue that if the matter
does not fall under the statute, then the court could never modify such an award,
because Section 13 sets out the only three situations in which a court can properly
modify an award. The spirit of Section 13 seems to suggest that the parties have a
specified time to notify the court of technical errors before such defenses are lost.
Nevertheless, the court held that parties' rights may never turn on the technicalities
of arbitration law.338
IX. SECTION 16: APPLICATIONS TO COURT
Section 16 of the U.A.A. provides that an application to the court under the
U.A.A. shall be by motion and shall be heard in the manner and upon the notice
provided by local law or rule for the making and hearing of motions. 339 It also states
that notice shall be served in the manner provided by local law for the service of a
summons in an action, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.3 40 The practical
330. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 13. In any of the three situations, the court cannot act if modifying
will affect the merits of the controversy.
331. Id.
332. 944 P.2d 623 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 960. P.2d 93 (Colo. 1998).
Colorado has shortened the statute of limitations to thirty days. For Colorado's version of § 13 see
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-215 (1993).
333. Kutch, 944 P.2d. at 624.
334. Id. at 625.
335. No. 03A01-9704-CH-00127, 1997 WL 412537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
336. 682 N.E.2d 156, 163 (I11. Ct.App. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 703 N.E.2d 7 (111. 1998)).
337. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 13.
338. Kutch, 944 P.2d at 625.
339. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 16.
340. Id.
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effect is to make states' rules of civil procedure applicable to court proceedings
based on the arbitration agreement, just like any other court proceeding.34" '
In MGA Insurance Co. v. Bakos, a party asserted that the court erred when it
rendered a decision on a petition to vacate an award without permitting the parties
to conduct discovery pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 206.7.342
The Pennsylvania Superior Court determined that under Section 16 applications to
court shall be determined in the manner prescribed by Pennsylvania civil law; and
because Pennsylvania law allows parties to conduct discovery whenever there is a
disputed issue of material fact, the parties were entitled to discovery.
343
X. SECTION 17: JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Once an agreement to arbitrate under Section 1 of the U.A.A. is made, Section
17 vests the power to review the arbitration award in the court.3'" This section
provides that an agreement to submit to arbitration confers jurisdiction on any
competent court to enforce the agreement and to enter judgment on any award
thereunder.
45
A. Enforcing the Arbitration Agreement
In Samson v. Hartsville Hospital Inc., the Tennessee Court of Appeals
considered a complaint requesting a declaratory judgment that the court had
jurisdiction to rule on the merits of a dispute.146 The complaint alleged that the
termination of the parties' Physician Agreement and the hospital's subsequent failure
to execute a written renewal of the contract resulted in the elimination of all
obligations under the contact, including the arbitration agreement. 47 The court noted
that under Section 1 of Tennessee's U.A.A. a written agreement to submit a
controversy to arbitration is "valid, enforceable, and irrevocable save upon such
grounds as exist [at] law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 3 48 Section
17(b) further directs that jurisdiction is conferred on the court to enforce the making
of the arbitration agreement and to enter judgment on the award thereunder.349 If a
party can show the kind of agreement described by Section 1 and a refusal by the
other party to arbitrate, the court is authorized by Section 17 to make a summary
determination as to whether the party is entitled to arbitration.35 In the present case
the action was initially filed by the party refusing to arbitrate rather than as specified
341. Id.
342. 699 A.2d 751, 754 (Pa. 1997); see PA. R. Civ. P. 206.7.
343. MGA Ins. Co., 699 A.2d at 754. For Pennsylvania's version of§ 16 see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
7315 (1980).
344. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 17.
345. Id. The U.A.A. defines "court" under this section as any court of competent jurisdiction of this
state.
346. No. 01-A-01-9609-CH-00430, 1997 WL 107167, at *1 (Tenn. App. Mar. 12, 1997).
347. Id.
348. Id. at 2; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-301(a) (1983).
349. Id. § 29-5-301(b).
350. Id. § 29-5-303.
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under Section 17, but the court felt that the minor deviation would not impair thehospital's rights under the U.A.A.35" ' After considering the intent of the parties and
the strong public policy reflected by the U.A.A. in favor of arbitration, the court
construed the arbitration clause liberally in favor of arbitration.352
In Nationwide General Insurance v. Estate of Truitt, the parties, pursuant topolicy provisions, submitted their dispute over insurance coverage to arbitration."3
Before the arbitration hearing could take place, however, Nationwide filed adeclaratory judgment action in court maintaining that a General Release which the
Estate had previously signed with another insurance company precluded her from
pursuing the present claim." 4 The arbitrators, in fear of usurping the court's
authority, refused to consider the general release issue on the grounds that thedeclaratory judgment proceeding prevented the exercise of their jurisdiction.355 TheEstate then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over
her legal right to pursue the claim.3 56
In reviewing the general law concerning arbitration, the court noted that
Delaware has adopted the U.A.A., which effects a public policy to enforce
arbitration agreements.357 The court stated "it is no longer of any consequence that
a court, otherwise competent to hear the dispute, is ousted of its jurisdiction by the
arbitration process."3 The court held that it did not have jurisdiction over the
declaratory judgment action once the arbitration process began because the parties
by contract had deprived it of jurisdiction of the matter. 59
B. Acceptance of Jurisdiction Between Eligible Forums
Two cases, Chicago Southshore v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation
District3 60 and Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District v. Chicago
Southshore,3 61 involve parties who had seen substantial litigation over thejurisdiction of a state court to enter judgment on an arbitration award. Chicago
Southshore, an Indiana partnership, entered into a service contract with the Northern
Indiana Commuter Transportation District (NICTD), an Indiana state agency.3 62 The
contract provided that any disputes were to be resolved through arbitrationproceedings in Indiana and all provisions of the agreement to be interpreted using
Indiana law.363 It stated "if either party claims that the arbitrator's decision is based
35 1. Samson, 1997 WL 107167, at *2; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-319 (creating a rare exceptionto the general rule that a party is not entitled to appeal a judgment or order unless it is a final one).
352. Samson. 1997 WL 107167, at *4. e
353. No. 96C-01-035, 1997 WL 524068, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997).
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. at *2.357. Truitt, 1997 WL 524068, at *2 (citing Pettinaro Constr. Co. V. Harry C. Partridge, Jr. & Sons,408 A.2d 957, 961 (1979)); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5701-25 (1972).
358. Truitt, 1997 WL 524068, at *2.
359. Id.
360. 682 N.E.2d 156 (11. App. Ct. 1997), rev'don other grounds, 703 N.E.2d 7 (111. 1998).
361. 685 N.E.2d 680 (Ind. 1997).
362. Chicago Southshore, 682 N.E.2d at 157.
363. Id. at 158.
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upon an error of law, it may... institute an action at law within the state of Indiana
to determine such legal issue. 364 Upon a disagreement over the interpretation of
certain contractual provisions, the parties submitted their dispute to arbitration.
365
The parties agreed to conduct the arbitration hearings in Illinois for the convenience
of the arbitrators who lived there.366 Following the hearings, an award was granted
to Southshore 67
The arbitration award was subsequently challenged in a declaratory judgment
action brought by NICTD in Indiana.368 Chicago Southshore moved to dismiss the
action, claiming the Indiana court did not have jurisdiction under Sections 1 and 17
of the Indiana U.A.A.3 69 The court held that because the arbitration hearings took
place in Illinois, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute and dismissed
the complaint.37 °
Chicago Southshore then filed a motion for confirmation of the arbitration
award in Illinois under its U.A.A., and NICTD responded by filing a limited
appearance to contest the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. 37' The
Illinois court determined it had jurisdiction to review and confirm the arbitrator's
award because it was the situs of the hearings and also because Indiana had already
refused to hear the case.372 NICTD asked the court to stay any confirmation, pending
a complete adjudication of the complaint for declaratory judgment which was then
before the Indiana Court of Appeals. 373 Illinois refused to stay the proceedings and
entered judgment confirming the award, leading NICTD to file an appeal.
3 74
Meanwhile, the Indiana Court of Appeals found that the Indiana trial court did
have jurisdiction.3 7 It held that the agreement and not the place of arbitration,
controlled the location of judicial review and that the arbitrators' interpretation of the
contract was contrary to law.376 The court then proceeded to rule on the merits of the
complaint.377 Following this decision, NICTD returned to Illinois and filed a petition
to vacate or modify the Illinois order which was subsequently denied by the Illinois
trial court and appealed by NICTD. 378
In analyzing the jurisdiction issue the Illinois court in Chicago Southshore
noted that the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court to review an arbitration






369. Northern Indiana, 685 N.E.2d at 683; see IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-2-1 to -22 (West 1969).
370. Chicago Southshore, 682 N.E.2d at 158.
371. Id., 682 N.E.2d at 158; see 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1 to 5/23 (West 1992).
372. Chicago Southshore, 682 N.E.2d at 158.
373. Id. at 158-59.
374. Id. at 159.
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that limited jurisdiction. 79 The court disagreed with the holding by the Indiana
Court of Appeals that an agreement to waive the situs of the arbitration did not alter
the contract provisions conferring subject matter jurisdiction to Indiana.8 ° It
observed that an arbitration agreement was to be construed in the same manner as
any other agreement, that a contractual right to arbitration could be waived as with
any other contract right, and that when a party conducted itself in a manner
inconsistent with the subject clause it was an indication of an abandonment of the
contractual right.3"'
The court held that the statutory language of the U.A.A., combined with the
circumstances present, determined jurisdiction of the award.8 2 It noted that at the
time the Illinois trial court was asked to confirm the award there were no binding
Indiana decisions regarding jurisdiction, and if the Illinois court had not acceptedjurisdiction there would have been no forum for enforcing the arbitration.3 3 The
Illinois court found it had jurisdiction of the arbitration award based upon the
statutory language of the Act, the Act's direction that it be construed uniformly, and
the common sense application of the Act to meet the needs of the parties. 8 4
In Northern Indiana, the Indiana Supreme Court ordered that the Indiana
proceedings be stayed for a reasonable time pending the outcome of the Illinois
proceedings.38 5 It found the case largely turned on the Full Faith and Credit Clause;
however, before it was bound by another state's judgment, it could first inquire into
the jurisdictional basis to determine if full faith and credit need be given.3 8 6 The
court noted that Illinois had decided NICTD's parol agreement to arbitrate conferred
jurisdiction on it, notwithstanding the general requirement under its U.A.A. for a
written agreement.38 7 In criticizing the decision, the Indiana court raised the
possibility that the Illinois court had placed excessive weight on the physical
presence of the arbitrators and ignored the intent which the parties expressed in the
agreement. 38 8 Despite its criticism, the court stated that because the jurisdictional
issue had been fully litigated in Illinois it would stand.389 Finally, the court focused
on whether the Indiana courts had subject matter jurisdiction over the case.39 0 It
noted that under Section 17 of the Indiana U.A.A. the making of an arbitration
agreement providing for arbitration in the state conferred jurisdiction on an Indiana
court to enforce the agreement and to enter judgment on an award.39'
379. Chicago Southshore, 682 N.E.2d at 159. The court reasoned it had limited judicial review
because the parties had chosen the forum and must therefore be content with the informalities and
possible eccentricities of their choice. Id.
380. Id. at 160.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 161.
384. Id.
385. Northern Indiana, 685 N.E.2d at 685.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 688.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 694.
391. Id. at 695.
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In considering whether the arbitration provisions could be waived, the court
held the existence of waiver depended upon the circumstances of each case. 92 It
found that the facts were "too murky" in the present case to constitute a basis for
finding waiver of the original agreement to arbitrate in Indiana because waiver of a
contractual right required an intentional relinquishment of a known right. 393 At best
the parol agreement was found sufficient for jurisdiction in Illinois as a matter of
Illinois law and, although NICTD had waived the requirement that all arbitration
proceedings occur in Indiana, the written agreement remained intact. Indiana had
jurisdiction over the subject matter even if it was bound by full faith and credit to
enter a judgment of dismissal upon final resolution of the matter in Illinois.394
C. Standing Among the Parties
In Stahulak v. Chicago, Stahulak, a firefighter, was discharged during his
probationary period of employment. His Union subsequently filed a grievance on
his behalf which proceeded to arbitration.395 The arbitrator found that under the
contract, the employer must first conduct an investigation and hold a review meeting
with the employee before it could discharge a probationary employee.396 Stahulak
was reinstated for the sole purpose of complying with the arbitrator's orders.3 9 After
an investigation and the required meeting, he was once again discharged by his
employer.39 s Stahulak filed a complaint in court, seeking to vacate the arbitration
award because the arbitrator had exceeded his powers in fashioning the remedy.' 9
The employer argued that Stahulak lacked standing to bring suit based on the Illinois
Public Labor Relations Act. This act provides that suits brought after an arbitration
which allege breach of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) can be brought
by the parties to the CBA. It also provides that the arbitration procedures of a CBA
under the Act are subject to the Illinois U.A.A.4 °°
The court took notice of federal cases interpreting the Labor Management
Relations Act, holding that "individual union members generally lack[ed] standing
to collaterally attack their union's resolution of a grievance."' 1 It also found that the
CBA itself set forth a grievance procedure which clearly contemplated that any
subsequent steps, including the invocation of arbitration, were to be initiated by the
Union.40 2 The court stated that allowing individual unionized employees to
collaterally attack their union's resolution of a grievance without showing that the
union breached its duty of fair representation would substantially undermine the
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 695-96.





400. Id. at 910. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/8-16 (West 1996) for the Illinois Public Labor Relations
Act.
401. Stahulak, 684 N.E.2d at 911; see 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1996).
402. Stahulak, 684 N.E.2d at 911.
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settlement machinery provided by a CBA. Therefore, it required a showing of
discrimination or bad faith.40 3
A similar case was handed down by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Willis
v. Veterans Home Board, which involved Willis, a probationary employee who was
not reinstated by her employer.404 The Veterans Homes Board informed Willis that
it could not deal with her directly because the union was her exclusive
representative. 40 5 The union subsequently pursued formal grievance procedures
which were denied by the Board. 40 6 The appellate court stated that review of an
administrative decision by certiorari is limited in scope.407 The court found it could
only consider whether (a) the administrative proceedings were regular and fair, (b)
the decision was made under an erroneous theory of law, (c) the decision was
arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable or fraudulent, and (d) there was evidence to
support the decision.4 ' The court found that nothing in the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) altered Willis's status as a purely at-will probationary employee
and that she had no protected property interest in continued employment.40 9 The
court found that not only was there no basis for extending direct judicial review for
an alleged breach of the CBA, but also that the U.A.A. listed the orders in an
arbitration proceeding under a public sector CBA from which an appeal could be
taken. 4' 0 The court held that the noncertification decision did not trigger appellate
review and that unless the CBA provided for an appeal process different from that
provided by the Act, the scope and method of judicial review was limited by the
statute.41'
D. Absolute Immunity
In Bushell v. Caterpillar, Inc., testimony was given during an arbitration
proceeding which stated that Bushell, an employee of Caterpillar, "slept on the job
and falsified employment records. ' ,41 2 Bushell filed a defamation action in court
against Caterpillar, which the trial court subsequently dismissed, holding that
statements given in quasi-judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged.4 3  In
affirming the decision, the appellate court found that all proceedings in which an
officer or tribunal exercises judicial functions, including arbitration proceedings, arejudicial proceedings." 4 It noted that arbitration proceedings in Illinois are governed
by the U.A.A.41 5 The court found that arbitration proceedings involve the
presentation of evidence and the cross-examination of witnesses, arbitrators are
403. Id. at 912.





409. Id. at 2.
410. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.26 (West 1996).
411. Willis, 1997 WL 193894, at *2.
412. 683 N.E.2d 1286, 1287 (III. Ct. App. 1997).
413. Id.
414. Id. at 1288 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 587 cmt. b, f (1977)).
415. Id. (citing 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-23 (West. 1994)).
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empowered to issue subpoenas and administer oaths, and that arbitration orders are
judicially enforceable and appealable in the same manner as civil cases, making them
quasi-judicial in nature.416
XI. SECTION 19: APPEALS
Section 19 directs that an appeal is to be taken in the manner and to the same
extent in arbitration as from orders or judgments in a civil action.1 7 Under this
section of the U.A.A., an appeal may be taken from:
(1) An order denying an application to compel arbitration...;
(2) An order granting an application to stay arbitration...;
(3) An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(4) An order modifying or correcting an award;
(5) An order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(6) A judgment or decree entered pursuant to the [U.A.A.]. 1 8
A. Authority ofArbitrator
In Smith v. Waller, Smith filed an action in the trial court for breach of a lease,
and Waller moved to dismiss based on an arbitration clause in the lease agreement.
4t9
The matter was subsequently submitted to arbitration, and the arbitrator awarded
Smith attorney's fees. 420 Waller filed a motion to vacate and/or modify the award
alleging the award was beyond the authority of the arbitrators, since neither the lease
nor the U.A.A. of Tennessee provided for attorney's fees.42' The motion was denied
by the trial court.422
The appellate court found that review of the trial court decision in an arbitration
case requires deferential treatment using a clearly erroneous standard.
3 It noted that
the arbitrators in Smith exceeded their powers when they went beyond the scope of
authority granted by the arbitration agreement, so that the court was allowed to
vacate an award under section 12.424 The court further held that the arbitrators
exceeded their powers by awarding attorney fees because the lease did not provide
for them and because it was well settled in the jurisdiction that attorney fees could
not be awarded in contract disputes unless the contract or applicable statutory or
decisional law so provided.425 The court stated that the award of attorney fees was
416. Id. at 1289; see 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-23 (West. 1994).
417. UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT § 19.
418. Id.
419. No. 03A01-9704-CH-00127, 1997 WL 412537, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
420. Id.
421. Id.; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-301 to -320 (1983).
422. Smith, 1997 WL 412537, at1*1.
423. Id.
424. Id. at *2; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-313(a) (1983)).
425. Smith, 1997 WL 412537, at 2.
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clearly erroneous and modified the judgment by removing the fees pursuant to
section 13.426
B. Order to Compel Arbitration
In Pierman v. Green Tree Financial Servicing Corp., the trial court denied
Green Tree's altemative motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration." 7
This decision was appealed under Section 817(A)(1) of the Oklahoma U.A.A., which
states that an order denying an application to compel arbitration is immediately
appealable.4 2' Green Tree based its position on the existence of an express provision
in the disputed contract which required all disputes to be resolved by arbitration.429
In response, Pierman argued that insurance coverage was exempt from arbitration
under Section 818 of the U.A.A.43 ° This section exempts "contracts between insuror
and insured, except where both the insured and insuror are insurance companies"
from the scope of the U.A.A. 431' The court would not consider the question of
whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempted the application of section 818.432 It
found that the dispute arose from a right granted by the contract and not an insurance
carrier-insured relationship.433 Therefore, the "state law governing the arbitrability
or nonarbitrability of insurer-insured disputes" was inapplicable.434
In Southeast Drilling & Blasting Services v. BRS Construction Co., after an
action to enforce a lien was filed in the Chancery court, BRS moved to compel
arbitration based on an arbitration agreement in the contract at issue.43 The trial
court reserved judgment on the motion for forty-five days, but directed that the
discovery proceedings for the current litigation should continue.436 The trial court
subsequently announced its decision to grant a motion to stay the pending arbitration
sought by BRS.437 BRS filed an application for extraordinary appeal of the trial
court's decision to compel discovery while its motion to compel arbitration was
pending. 38
The appellate court noted that by enacting the U.A.A., the General Assembly
had embraced a legislative policy favoring enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.439
Under section 29-5-303, a court can make a summary determination concerning
whether a party is entitled to arbitration but shall stay "[a]ny action or proceeding
426. Id. The court chose to modify the judgment; however, the court noted that it could have vacated
the award under section 12. Id. at 2; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-313(a) (1983).
427. 933 P.2d 955, 956 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
428. Id. at 957; see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 17(A)(1) (West 1991).
429. Pierman, 933 P.2d at 956.
430. Id. at 957; see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 818 (1991).




435. No. OIAOI-9706-CH-00272, 1997 WL 399387, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 16, 1997); see TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-5-302 to -303 (1996).
436. Southeast, 1997 WL 399387, at*1.
437. Id. Once entered, an order resolving a motion to stay arbitration may be appealable as of right.
Id. (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-319 (West 1996)).
438. Id.
439. Id. at 2; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-301 to -320 (1983).
[Vol. 1998, No. 2
36
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1998, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1998/iss2/8
The Uniform Arbitration Act
involving an issue subject to arbitration ... if an order for arbitration has been
made." '" The appellate court found that the provisions evidenced a clear statutory
intent that courts are to determine if a party was entitled to arbitration "prior to
conducting any proceedings related to the merits."' ' The court held that some
discovery might be necessary to determine whether a motion to compel arbitration
should be granted, but that such discovery is limited to matters relevant to the motion
compelling arbitration."42 Once the trial court had ruled on the motion to compel
arbitration, the parties could appeal pursuant to section 29-5-319 of the Tennessee
Code.443
In United Services Automobile Association v. Shears, the court considered
whether the trial court's previous order compelling arbitration was appealable."
The court noted that the order compelling arbitration was collateral to the declaratory
judgment action, which was the main cause of action. It then decided that Rule of
Appellate Procedure number 313, which allows a court to take an appeal as of right
from a collateral order of a lower court, made the order to compel arbitration
appealable even though it was interlocutory. 5
The next issue which the court considered was whether the court's order
compelling arbitration was correct." 6 Although the insurance policy between the
parties had no provisions requiring arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim, the
trial court found that the public policy of Pennsylvania required arbitration due to its
laws on insurance coverage." 7 The court held the insurance policy at issue complied
with the laws of Pennsylvania and reversed the trial court's decision.
448
C. Foreign Judgments
In Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District v. Chicago Southshore
& South Bend Railroad, the Supreme Court of Indiana reviewed an Illinois judgment
which had found that Illinois had jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration award.449 The
issue before the court was whether the Illinois judgment precluded the court from
reviewing an arbitration award.450 The court found that the answer depended on
whether the Illinois court regarded its judgment as final and binding.4 5 1 The court
noted that although there were no Illinois decisions regarding the res judicata effect
440. Southeast Drilling, 1997 WL 399387, at *2 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-303(d) (1983)).
441. Id. (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-303(d) (1983)).
442. Id.
443. Id. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-319 permits an appeal as of right from an order denying an
application to compel arbitration or an order granting an application to stay arbitration. Southeast
Drilling, 1997 WL 399387, at *2. An order compelling arbitration is not appealable as of right. Id.
444. 692 A.2d 161, 162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
445. Id. at 163. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7320(a)(1) (1980) provides that a party may take an appeal
from a court order denying an application to compel arbitration; however, there is no corresponding
statutory authority in existence that allows a party to take an appeal from an order that compels
arbitration. United Services, 692 A.2d at 165 (Ford, J., dissenting).
446. United Services, 692 A.2d at 163.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 165.
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to be given a judgment confirming an arbitration award that was on appeal, the
preclusive effect of such a judgment appeared to be the same as for any otherjudgment.45 2 It found that the Illinois U.A.A. provides that appeals are to be taken
in the same manner, upon the same terms, and with like effect as in civil cases. 5 a
The Indiana court, unable to find direction from Illinois precedent, held that full faith
and credit required a stay of the Indiana proceedings for a reasonable time to permit
the resolution of appellate proceedings in Illinois before considering the res judicata





452. Id. at 689.
453. Id.; see 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18 (West 1992).
454. Northern Indiana, 685 N.E.2d at 696.
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